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By Donald L. Shaneyfelt*
The Personal Liability Maze of
Corporate Directors and Officers
I. INTRODUCTION
The precedent shattering impact of Escott v. BarChris Construc-
tion Corp.,' Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 2 and related cases
coupled with more stringent standards imposed by state legisla-
tures and courts mandate that corporate directors and officers re-
examine their duties and responsibilities if they are to avoid
personal liability for improper actions taken in the corporate
name. This is true even though the United States Supreme Court
recently has shown some moderation in its approach to such liabil-
ity in Sante Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green,3 Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores,4 and Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder.5 However,
the trend towards strict accountability leading to possible individ-
ual liability still thrives and extends to corporations, their officers,
inside directors, outside directors, underwriters, accountants, law-
yers and even to "tippees. ' ' 6 Further encouragement to plaintiffs
in shareholder derivative actions is the availability of jury trials.7
This trend will continue so long as society follows the practice, "if
in doubt, litigate."
In approaching this topic it is essential to maintain the distinc-
* Professor of Law, University of Nebraska. B.A. 1947, J.D. 1950, University of
Nebraska; M.A. 1958, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. I would like to
express my appreciation to Ms. Mary Velte for her assistance in checking
footnote citations and for the many drafts that she willingly typed.
1. 283 F. Supp. -643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
2. 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971).
3. 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (plaintiff must allege deception derived from some mate-
rial misstatement or omission).
4. 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (there must be a purchaser/seller relationship to meet
standing requirement).
5. 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (scienter required for rule lOb-5 liability).
6. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 841 n.4 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. de-
nied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969) (defendants had divulged material inside informa-
tion to friends outside the corporation, and such information was used by the
"tippees" to make purchases). See also Note, Rule 10b-5: Scope of Liability
Extended as Former Outsiders Become Market Insiders, 58 NEB. L. REV. 866
(1979).
7. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970).
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tion between suits involving internal mismanagement and those in
connection with securities sales. This is particularly important in
view of the Supreme Court's emphasis on the desirability of leav-
ing supervision of most areas of corporate management to the
state courts.8 This article will discuss potential individual liability
of corporate directors and officers in shareholder derivative suits
and third party actions under selected federal laws, the Nebraska
Business Corporation Act,9 and the common law as interpreted by
Nebraska courts. Indemnification, contribution and liability insur-
ance will be included in this discussion. However, Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) enforcement actions are not in-
cluded.
II. LIABILITY IN NEBRASKA
A. Nebraska Business Corporation Act
With regard to director liability, Section 21-2046 of the Nebraska
Business Corporation Act'0 which has been adopted for the most
part from the Model Business Corporation Act," specifically pro-
vides that all directors who vote for or assent to declarations of
illegal dividends, sales of shares, or distributions of assets shall be
jointly and severally liable to the corporation for specific amounts
determined by a procedure set forth in the statute.'2 A director is
8. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus. Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977). See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v.
Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
9. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 21-2001 to 21-20,134 (Reissue 1977).
10. Id. § 21-2046.
11. AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, MODEL BusINEss CORPORATION AcT ANNOTATED
§ 48 (1st ed. 1960) [hereinafter cited as MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT. ANN.].
12. In addition to any other liabilities imposed by law upon directors of a
corporation:
(1) Directors of a corporation who vote for or assent to the decla-
ration of any dividend or other distribution of the assets of a corpora-
tion to its shareholders contrary to the provisions of section 21-2001
to 21-20,134 or contrary to any restrictions contained in the articles of
incorporation, shall be jointly and severally liable to the corporation
for the amount of such dividend which is paid or the value of such
assets which are distributed in excess of the amount of such divi-
dend or distribution which could have been paid or distributed with-
out a violation of the provisions of sections 21-2001 to 21-20,134 or the
restrictions in the articles of incorporation;
(2) Directors of a corporation who vote for or assent to the
purchase of its own shares contrary to the provisions of sections 21-
2001 to 21-20,134 shall be jointly and severally liable to the corpora-
tion for the amount of consideration paid for such shares which is in
excess of the maximum amount which could have been paid therefor
without a violation of the provisions of sections 21-2001 to 21-20,134,
(3) The directors of a corporation who vote for or assent to any
distribution of assets of a corporation to its shareholders during the
liquidation of the corporation without the payment and discharge of,
or making adequate provision for, all known debts, obligations, and
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presumed to assent to actions taken unless his dissent is entered
in the minutes of the meeting or unless he files a written dissent
with the person acting as secretary for the meeting.13 The section
also establishes certain defenses to personal liability where the di-
rector relied and acted in good faith on financial statements of the
corporation which were represented as being correct by the presi-
dent or officer having charge of its books of account, or which were
stated in a written report by an independent accounting firm.14
The Act further provides that any director held liable for an im-
proper dividend or distribution of assets shall be entitled to contri-
bution in proportion to the amounts received by the shareholder
who accepted or received the dividends or assets knowing them to
have been improper.' 5 A director is also entitled to contribution
from other directors who voted for or assented to the improper ac-
liabilities of the corporation shall be jointly and severally liable to
the corporation for the value of such assets which are distributed, to
the extent that such debts, obligations and liabilities of the corpora-
tion are not thereafter paid and discharged; and "
(4) The directors of a corporation who vote for or assent to the
making of a loan to an officer or director of the corporation, or the
making of any loan secured by shares of the corporation, except as
permitted in sections 21-2001 to 21-20,134, shall be jointly and sever-
ally liable to the corporation for the amount of such loan until the
repayment thereof.
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 21-2046 (Reissue 1977).
13. A director of a corporation who is present at a meeting of its board of
directors at which action on any corporate matter is taken shall be
presumed to have assented to the action taken unless his dissent
shall be entered in the minutes of the meeting or unless he shall file
his written dissent to such action with the person acting as the secre-
tary of the meeting before the adjournment thereof or shall forward
such dissent by registered mail to the secretary of the corporation
immediately after adjournment of the meeting. Such right to dissent
shall not apply to a director who voted in favor of such action.
Id.
14. A director shall not be liable under subdivision (1), (2) or (3) of this
section if he relied and acted in good faith upon financial statements
of the corporation represented to him to be correct by the president
or the officer of such corporation having charge of its books of ac-
count, or stated in a written report by an independent public or certi-
fied public accountant or firm of such accountants fairly to reflect the
financial condition of such corporation, nor shall he be so liable if in
good faith in determining the amount available for any such dividend
or distribution he considered the assets to be of their book value.
Id.
15. Any director against whom a claim shall be asserted under or pursu-
ant to this section for the payment of a dividend or other distribution
of assets of a corporation and who shall be held liable thereon, shall
be entitled to contribution from the shareholders who accepted or
received any such dividend or assets, knowing such dividend or dis-
tribution to have been made in violation of sections 21-2001 to 21-
20,134, in proportion to the amounts received by them.
[Vol. 58:692
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tion.16 Since no other provision concerning liability of directors
and officers is found in the Nebraska Business Corporation Act
much is left to common law principles of liability. This is particu-
larly true in view of the lack of a defense under the Act where an
illegal payment has been made and the director was not aware of
the illegality through his own negligence.
B. Nebraska Securities Act17
Section 8-1102(1) of the Nebraska Revised Statutes makes it un-
lawful for anyone engaged in the offer, sale, or purchase of a secur-
ity to employ any scheme to defraud, make any untrue statement
of a material fact, omit a material fact making the statements mis-
leading, or engage in any fraudulent act. 18 This section is pat-
terned after SEC rule 10b-519 and is likely to be given a similar
application by the courts insofar as the personal liability of direc-
tors and officers is concerned.20 There are two major differences,
however: (1) In most rule 10b-5 cases the burden of proof rests
with the plaintiff,2 1 while under the Nebraska Act the burden of
proof rests with the defendant.22 (2) Recovery is also permissible
for negligent omission or untruth under the Nebraska Act,23 while
scienter is required under rule 10b-5.24 On the other hand, under
the Nebraska Act standing is limited to purchasers of securities. 25
The Act contains no language which would indicate an intent to
preempt the area; therefore, it appears that common law actions
may be pursued in lieu of bringing action under the Act.26
C. Common Law
The Nebraska Supreme Court has consistently followed a strict
common law policy with regard to director and officer liability. The
1935 case of Ashby v. Peters27 involved the sale of bonds. The
16. "Any director against whom a claim shall be asserted under or pursuant to
this section shall be entitled to contribution from the other directors who
voted for or assented to the aotion upon which the claim is asserted." Id.
17. Id. §§ 8-1101 to -1124.
18. Id. § 8-1102(1).
19. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1978).
20. See § MI-B of text infra.
21. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1978).
22. NEB. REV. STAT. § 8-1102(1) (Reissue 1977).
23. Id.
24. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
25. NEB. REV. STAT. § 8-1102(1) (Reissue 1977).
26. For a complete discussion of this aspect of the Securities Act of Nebraska,
see Comment, The Securities Act of Nebraska: An Overview, 56 NEB. L. REV.
836 (1977).
27. 128 Neb. 338, 258 N.W. 639 (1935).
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bonds themselves and the selling circulars indicated the bonds
would be a first mortgage on certain property while in fact there
was already a sizable mortgage on the property. Individual direc-
tors were sued for fraud by a purchaser of the bonds. The direc-
tors defended on the theory that they did not know what the
statements contained and that they had delegated the responsibil-
ity of drafting the statements to an executive committee.28 The
court held that "[w] here the duty of knowing exists, ignorance due
to neglect of duty on the part of a director creates the same liability
as actual knowledge and a failure to act thereon. ' 29 The court fur-
ther adopted the language that "[directors] may not delegate their
responsibility, and are not excused from liability because they
committed their duties to an executive committee."30 The test
used by the court was that "[t]he law requires of directors such
diligence and supervision as the situation and the nature of the
business requires. Their duty is to watch over and guard all the
interests committed to them. '3 1 In Ashby, plaintiff alleged that the
directors had fraudulently induced him to purchase the bonds in
question. The court in this regard stated: "Fraud in Nebraska may
be without scienter or knowledge. '32
In a 1977 case, Fowler v. Elm Creek State Bank,33 the Nebraska
Supreme Court reinforced its position with regard to individual lia-
bility. The case was tried on two causes of action-one for fraud,
the other for negligent mismanagement and dissipation of corpo-
rate assets. The trial court held for plaintiff on both counts and its
findings were upheld by the supreme court. In its decision, the
supreme court stated:
[A] n individual director cannot escape liability for fraudulent corporate
action taken under authorization affirmatively approved by him merely by
asserting his ignorance of facts he had a duty to know and should have
known. Where the duty of knowing facts exists, ignorance due to neglect
of duty on the part of the director creates the same liability as actual
knowledge and a failure to act thereon.
3 4
From the language of the Fowler case, an allegation of negligence
appears to suffice as a basis for civil liability in Nebraska. The neg-
28. Id. at 345, 258 N.W. at 643.
29. Id. at 348, 258 N.W. at 644.
30. Id. at 346-47, 258 N.W. at 643.
31. Id. at 347, 258 N.W. at 643.
32. Id. at 346, 258 N.W. at 643.
33. 198 Neb. 631, 254 N.W.2d 415 (1977).
34. Id. at 638, 254 N.W.2d at 419.
[Vol. 58:692
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ligence test applied by the court may be higher for one individual
than for another depending upon the individual's position of re-
sponsibility in the company, but scienter is not required in any
event.
Recently the Nebraska Supreme Court handed down its deci-
sion in Doyle v. Union Insurance Co. 35 which adopts the position
set out above and clarifies to a great extent common law director
and officer liability in Nebraska. This case involved the sale of as-
sets of one company to another company at a price much below
their actual value. The sale had been approved by a majority of the
board of directors, a majority of the policyholders and the Ne-
braska Director of Insurance. The lower court found the directors
who voted for the sale personally liable on the basis that they had
breached their fiduciary duty to the corporation and shareholders.
This decision was upheld by the supreme court. The legal basis for
liability of the directors was their negligence in failing to inform
themselves in an appreciable degree on a matter of utmost impor-
tance to the policyholders. In reaching this result the court
adopted certain general principles 36 as to director duties. Direc-
tors are fiduciaries or trustees and must comply with their fiduci-
ary duties in dealing with the corporation and its shareholders.
Where a director has acted in complete good faith and breached no
fiduciary duty then he is not liable for mere mistakes in judgment.
However, a violation by a trustee of a duty required by law,
whether willful, fraudulent or negligent is a breach of trust and the
trustee is liable for any damages proximately caused by the
breach. Where directors are empowered to sell all the assets of the
corporation, they must act with at least the degree of care that or-
dinary prudent man would exercise in their own affairs. With re-
gard to the question whether policyholder approval ratified
voidable acts of the directors and thereby absolved them of liabil-
ity, the court found that a complete disclosure of all material facts
was not made to the policyholders and for that reason policyholder
approval did not operate as a ratification.37 The Nebraska common
law standard of conduct for directors and officers is now clearly
established at a standard as high or higher than that imposed by
the courts with regard to civil actions under the Federal Securities
Act of 193338 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.39
35. 202 Neb. 599, 277 N.W.2d 36 (1979).
36. Id. at 608, 277 N.W.2d at 41.
37. Id. at 622, 277 N.W.2d at 47.
38. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1933) [hereinafter cited as 1933 Act].
39. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1934) [hereinafter cited as
1934 Act].
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I. LIABILITY UNDER THE FEDERAL SECURITIES ACTS
A. Liability Under Sections 11, 12 and 15 of the Federal Securities Act
of 1933
The main source of litigation covering personal liability under
these sections involves the registration statement4o which must be
filed with the SEC before any public offers of securities can be
made through the mail or in interstate commerce. Although only a
majority of the board of directors is required to sign the statement,
every person who at the time of filing was a director of the issuing
corporation or performed functions similar to those of a director or
who, with his consent, is named in the registration statement as
being or about to become a director, is also responsible for its con-
tents.
4 1
Under section 11, an innocent purchaser who had no reason to
doubt the accuracy of a company's registration statement, has a
right of action against these individuals if there were material
omissions or untruths as of the effective date of the statement. A
"material" omission or untruth is one which, if it had been re-
vealed or truthfully reported, would deter, or tend to deter, an av-
erage person from buying the security.42
Liability under section 11, however, is not absolute. The avail-
able statutory defenses include (1) proof that the investor knew of
the untrue omission at the time he acquired the security; (2) proof
that the investor relied on the misrepresentation or omission if se-
curities were acquired subsequent to the time an earnings state-
ment was generally available to security holders;43 (3) due
diligence on the part of directors and officers, but not on the part of
the issuer;44 (4) a resignation prior to the effective date of the re-
gistration statement, with notification to the SEC and issuer; and
(5) where a registration statement became effective without the
knowledge of the individual and he informed the SEC and the pub-
lic he was unaware of the registration statement as soon as he
learned it had become effective.45
40. A registration statement is composed of a prospectus and other information
which is available to the public from SEC files.
41. 1933 Act, § 6(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77f(a) (1976). A majority of the board of directors,
the principal executive officer, principal finance officer, and the comptroller
or principal accounting officer must sign the registration statement.
42. 1933 Act, § 11(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77h(b) (1976). See generally R. JENNINGS & H.
MARSH, SEcuxrris REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 825-35 (4th ed. 1977).
43. The earnings statement must cover a period of at least 12 months beginning
after the effective date of registration.
44. The standards of required diligence differ as between the expert and nonex-
pert.
45. 1933 Act, § llb(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(2) (1976).
[Vol. 58:692
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Section 12 of the Act provides for civil liability where a person
offers or sells a security without complying with registration re-
quirements required by section 5 of the Act.46 A director or officer
is an "offerer" or "seller" within the meaning of section 12 if his
"actions are a substantial factor in causing a purchaser to buy a
security.... It is unnecessary to show that the offerer or seller
owns the security for the definition encompasses any significant
participation in the sale on behalf of the actual owner."47 In such a
case the individual liability extends to "the consideration paid for
such security with interest thereon, less the amount of any income
received thereon, upon tender of such security, or for damages if
he no longer owns the security."4 8
Is a director or officer of the issuer which sells securities in vio-
lation of section 5 liable if he personally does not make the sale?
In such a case if he "controls" the issuer, he is liable under section
15 "unless the controlling person had no knowledge of or reason-
able ground to believe in the existence of the facts by reason of
which the liability of the controlled person is alleged to exist."49
No requirement of reasonable investigation is imposed on a con-
trolling person, but there must be a reasonable basis for his belief.
The SEC in rule 405 defines control as "the possession, direct or
indirectly, of the power to direct or cause the direction of the man-
agement and policies of a person, whether through the ownership
of voting securities, by contract, or otherwise."50 This definition
obviously covers most corporate directors and officers.
All section 11 and 12 suits must be brought "within one year
after the discovery of the untrue statement or the omission, or af-
ter such discovery should have been made by the exercise of rea-
sonable diligence .... In no event shall any such action be
brought .... more than three years after the security was bona
fide offered to the public .... 51 Recoverable damages are the dif-
ference between the amount paid for the security (not exceeding
the price at which it was offered to the public) and its value at the
time of the suit; or if the damages are less than the damages repre-
sented by the difference between the amount paid for the security
and its value at the time of the suit, the difference between the
amount paid and the price at which the security could have been
disposed of in the market before suit, or the price at which the se-
curity could have been disposed of after suit but before judg-
46. 1933 Act, § 12(1), 15 U.S.C. § 771(1976); 1933 Act, § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1976).
47. Lawler v. Gilliam, 569 F.2d 1283, 1287-88 (4th Cir. 1978).
48. 1933 Act, § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1976).
49. 1933 Act, § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1976).
50. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2(f) (1978).
51. 1933 Act, § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1976).
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ment.5 2
Except for the defense of due diligence 53 and the question of
what is a "material" omission,54 the above enumerated defenses
permit only rudimentary interpretation.
1. Due Diligence
With regard to due diligence, the court in Escott v. BarChris
Construction Corp.55 extensively analyzed the section 11 due dili-
gence defenses. The statutory defense is two-pronged, requiring a
more stringent standard for non-expert portions of the registration
statement as opposed to those purported to be made on the au-
thority of an expert.5 6 Judge McLean, under the facts of BarChris,
held that auditors were experts while attorneys and underwriters
were not.
57
Where the questioned statement is made by an expert, an in-
vestigation is not required if the non-expert directors or officers
had no reason to believe that the statement was false or mislead-
ing.58 However, on all non-expert information, the directors and
officers have a duty to thoroughly investigate to meet the due dili-
gence test.59 The test set forth in the Act is "that required of a
prudent man in the management of his own property. '60
The prudent man test must be applied in connection with the
relative position of the individual in the corporate hierarchy. In-
side directors and officers are the individuals potentially most lia-
ble under the Act as they are in the best position to discover and
correct false or misleading statements. Their participation in the
transaction in question may make it impossible for them to prove
ignorance of any misrepresentation. 61 Outside directors, on the
other hand, have placed management in a position of trust and are
entitled to rely on its information about the day-to-day conduct of
the business. To require that outside directors maintain an ad-
52. 1933 Act, § 11(e), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1976).
53. See text accompanying notes 55-63 infra.
54. See text accompanying notes 64-67 infra.
55. 283 F. Supp. 643, 682-703 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). See generally Folk, Civil Liabilities
under the Federal Securities Acts: The BarChris Case, 55 VA. L. REV. 1 (1969).
56. Non-expert portions of a registration settlement are those "not purporting to
be made on the authority of an expert, and not purporting to be a copy of or
extract from a report or valuation of an expert, and not purporting to be made
on the authority of a public official ... ." 1933 Act, § 11(b) (3) (A), 15 U.S.C.
§ 77k(b) (3) (A) (1976).
57. Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. at 683.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. 1933 Act, § 11(c), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(c) (1976).
61. Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. at 684.
[Vol. 58:692
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verse relationship in overall management would interject a poten-
tially detrimental conflict. Nevertheless, the outside directors,
while they need not personally verify every representation made
by management, may not avoid the responsibility to know and
guide the affairs of the company.62 They should have an independ-
ent knowledge of the company's business drawn from a close read-
ing of the documents which constitute the corporate history and
any other documents which come before them for approval; they
should be aware of the general conditions in the industry involved
and the reputation which the company enjoys for sound manage-
ment; and they should bring to bear any specialized knowledge
they may have as lawyers, accountants, or underwriters. Outside
directors should carefully read the registration statement and if it
is inconsistent with the independent knowledge they should rea-
sonably have acquired, they should verify the representations
made by management through an adversary investigation. 63 Com-
pliance with these guidelines would meet the due diligence test as
established by the BarChris court.
2. Materiality64
Liability under section 11 arises only when the omission or mis-
representation is "material." In BarChris, the court applied a test
of materiality to a purchase from a primary offering by the issuer.
In this factual setting, the court held material matters are those
"which such an investor needs to know before he can make an in-
telligent, informed decision whether or not to buy the security. ' 65
It is most difficult, however, to apply this same standard compre-
hensively. What is material to a purchaser from an original issue
may be completely different in other circumstances such as in an
exchange offer or proxy contest. This problem was recognized by
the court in Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp.66 In
that case, the action under section 11 was brought on behalf of
shareholders who had exchanged their shares. The court used the
"hypothetical reasonably prudent shareholder" test: "a fact is 'ma-
terial' in a registration statement whenever a rational connection
exists between its disclosure and a viable alternative course of ac-
tion by any appreciable number of investors. ' 67 Thus, the specific
62. Id. at 688-89.
63. Id.
64. Materiality is an issue under all the antifraud sections of the Federal
Securities Acts.
65. 283 F. Supp. at 681.
66. 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
67. Id. at 571.
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facts of the case will determine the question of materiality and the
courts will make the ultimate decision.
B. The "New Fraud" and Implied Liability Under the Securities Acts
This discussion will be limited to the general antifraud sections
of the Securities Acts-section 10 of the 1934 Act and section 17 of
the 1933 Act. Section 10 has produced considerable litigation in
this area while section 17 has excellent potential as a source of
plaintiff litigation.68
A director or officer may incur civil and criminal liabilities
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in connection with
1. applications, reports, or documents filed or required to be
filed by the corporation; 69
2. statements as to stock ownership in the corporation, re-
quired to be filed by the director, and transactions in such
stock;70
3. manipulation of security prices; 71
4. use of manipulative and deceptive devices; 72
5. improper solicitation of proxies; 73
6. unlawful representations; 74
7. concealing material information.75
Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 of the 1934 Act are broader than
Section 11 of the 1933 Act in a number of respects. The 1934 Act
and implementing rule apply to a large number of areas, only one
of which concerns misrepresentations and omissions in registra-
tion statements.76 In Sargent v. Genesco, InC., 77 the court held
68. For an excellent table depicting express and implied civil liabilities for mis-
representation and insider trading under the securities acts, see Hazen, Cor-
porate Chartering and the Securities Markets: Shareholder Suffrage,
Corporate Responsibility and Managerial Accountability, 1978 Wis. L. REV.
391, 438-39.
69. This liability may be based on sections providing express private remedies.
E.g., 1933 Act, §§ 11, 12(2), 15 U.S.C §§ 77k, 771(2) (1976); 1934 Act, § 18(a), 15
U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1976). Or it may be based upon those sections creating im-
plied remedies. E.g., 1933 Act, § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976); 1934 Act,
§§ 10(b), 14(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78n(a) (1976).
70. Such provisions include 1934 Act, §§ 13(d), 16(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d), 78p(a)
(1976).
71. Section 9(e) of the 1934 Act provides an express private remedy for manipu-
lation, while litigants have relied on § 10(b) and rule lob-5 as well. 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78i(e), 78j(b); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1978).
72. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976).
73. Id. § 78n(a); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1978).
74. See notes 69-73 supra.
75. Id.
76. So far as is here pertinent, Section 10, 15 U.S.C. 78j (1976) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the
[Vol. 58:692
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three basic elements must be pleaded to prevail in lOb-5 actions:
"(1) conduct by the defendants proscribed by the rule; (2) a
purchase or sale of securities by the plaintiffs 'in connection with'
such proscribed conduct; and (3) resultant damages to the plain-
tiff." s7 8 In addition, the Genesco court pointed out that a rule lOb-5
"plaintiff does not have to allege privity or any contemporaneous
market trading by the plaintiff and defendant to state a claim for
relief.' 79 Although privity does not have to be alleged, privity may
be a factor in establishing a causal connection between the defend-
ant's conduct and the plaintiff's injury, and privity may determine
the availability of a remedy such as rescission or restitution.80 The
necessary causal connection can also be established by pleading a
nexus which reinforces the full disclosure theory underlying the
Act and rule rather than one which attempts to protect a share-
holder's proprietary interest.8 1 In Sante Fe Industries, Inc. v.
Green,82 plaintiff maintained a rule 10b-5 action alleging that under
a short-form merger there was an undervaluation of his shares in
connection with the forced sale required by the merger. Although
the lower court upheld the complaint, the Supreme Court reversed
on the basis that plaintiff failed to allege an act of deception de-
rived from some material misstatement or omission.83 State law
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the
mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security registered in a national securities exchange or any se-
curity not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or con-
trivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission many prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the pub-
lic interest or for the protection of investors.
SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1978), states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use
of any means or instrumentality of interestate [sic] commerce, or of
the mails or any facility of any national securities exchange.
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud.
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice or course of business which oper-
ates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
Rule lOb-5 was promulgated pursuant to the 1934 Act, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78j(b) (1976).
77. 492 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1974).
78. Id. at 759.
79. Id. at 760.
80. Id. at 761.
81. Id.
82. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
83. Id. at 474.
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requirements on short-form merger had been fully complied with
and plaintiff had been advised of all valuations of the assets includ-
ing not only the one used but other valuations showing a much
higher value.84
By focusing on the element of deception, the Court clearly rein-
forced holdings limiting rule lOb-5 actions to actions based on full
disclosure rather than the protection of proprietary interests. In
this connection, Mr. Justice White stated: "[T] he court repeatedly
has described the 'fundamental purpose' of the Act [10(b)] as im-
plementing a 'philosophy of full disclosure'; once full and fair dis-
closure has occurred, the fairness of the terms of the transaction is
at most a tangential concern of the statute. '85
In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,86 the Court re-
versed the lower court and upheld the "Birnbaum" rule87 requir-
ing that plaintiff be either a seller or puchaser of securities in a
rule lOb-5 action.88 The question left unanswered by the Court was
whether exceptions to the purchaser-seller requirement previ-
ously approved by circuit courts are still valid. Situations in which
the individual makes a "delay" purchase 89 and transactions based
upon a contractual agreement would appear to be situations enti-
tled to standing.90
In further support of the disclosure concept, the Supreme Court
in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder9l held that scienter must be present
under rule lOb-5. In reaching this conclusion, Mr. Justice Powell
relied heavily on a contrast of the language of rule lob-5 with the
elaborate safeguards on expert liability found in other sections of
the Act such as section 11. Justice Powell defined scienter as "a
mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or de-
fraud. '92 He noted that in certain cases recklessness is considered
a form of intentional conduct for purposes of imposing liability, but
stated that the court need not "address ... the question whether,
in some circumstances, reckless behavior is sufficient for civil lia-
bility under § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. ' '93 This language indicates that
simple negligence will not be sufficient for a successful rule lOb-5
84. Id. at 474 n.14.
85. Id. at 477-78.
86. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
87. Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952); Stockwell v.
Reynolds & Co., 252 F. Supp. 215, 219 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
88. 193 F.2d at 463.
89. A "delay" purchase is a sale of securities subsequent to the frustration of an
intended transaction.
90. Commerce Reporting Co. v. Puretec, Inc., 290 F. Supp. 715 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
91. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
92. Id. at 194 n.12.
93. Id. See generally Bucklo, The Supreme Court Attempts to Define Scienter
Under Rule 10b-5: Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 29 STAN. L. REV. 213 (1977).
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action. Where the line will be drawn is still unclear.94 Later circuit
court cases have held that scienter should be read to include reck-
lessness. 95
In rule lOb-5 cases, plaintiff must show that the omission or er-
roneous statement was material to his decision. In arriving at a
test of "materiality," the Supreme Court has employed different
language. For example, SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.96 has been
cited by the Supreme Court in a rule 10b-5 case as supporting a
test that facts are material if "a reasonable investor might have
considered them important in the making of this decision."97 How-
ever, in a later proxy case, the Supreme Court used as a test
whether "there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable
shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to
vote."98 As a practical matter the problem of proof will be the
same under either definition used by the Court. Whichever test is
used, the ultimate result will require an objective evaluation of
that particular case. In this regard, Justice Marshall in TSC Indus-
tries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc.99 held materiality to be "a mixed ques-
tion of law and fact" and stated that the determination of
materiality "requires delicate assessments of the inferences a 'rea-
sonable shareholder' would draw from a given set of facts and the
significance of those inferences to him ... -"100 "[T]hese assess-
ments," he declared, "are peculiarly ones for the trier of fact."'01
The three basic elements designated by the Genesco court 0 2 to
be pleaded in rule lOb-5 actions are still valid within the restraints
imposed by the United States Supreme Court. Although the trend
towards liberal interpretation of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 has
been stayed, at least for the present, liability for directors and of-
ficers of corporations in such actions is still possible and should be
carefully considered by potential defendants before taking any ac-
tion which might subject themselves to personal liability.
94. The complaint alleged that proper accounting procedures would have re-
vealed the fact that the president had a rule that only he personally could
open mail addressed to him or to his attention. This rule would have facili-
tated his juggling of investment accounts. 425 U.S. at 190.
95. Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 40 (2d Cir. 1978) (where
"aider and abettor owes a fiduciary duty to the defrauded party, recklessness
satisfies the scienter requirement"); Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical
Corp., 553 F.2d 1033 (7th Cir. 1977).
96. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
97. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972).
98. TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (emphasis ad-
ded).
99. 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
100. Id. at 450.
101. Id.
102. See notes 43-45 & accompanying text supra.
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Federal securities statutes contain no limitation period ex-
pressly applicable to claims under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5.
Such claims are governed by statutes of limitations of the forum
state. The trend in the federal courts is to select the statute of limi-
tation period by applying a "resemblance test." Thus, the limita-
tion period that the forum state applies to the state remedy which
bears close substantial resemblance to rule lOb-5, or which best
effectuates its purpose, will be applied in the federal action. 103 In
applying the resemblance test the federal courts have generally
held that broad remedial purposes of the Federal Securities Act
are best served by a longer, not shorter, statute of limitations and
consequently will pick the longer statute of limitations. This posi-
tion has been supported by the Supreme Court in Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder.lo4 Mr. Justice Powell, in a footnote, adopted the fol-
lowing language:
Since no statute of limitations is provided for civil actions under
§ 10(b), the law of limitations of the forum State is followed as in other
cases of judicially implied remedies. . . .Although it is not always certain
which state statute of limitations should be followed, such statutes of limi-
tations usually are longer than the period provided under § 13.105
Federal law fixes the date when the claim accrues so as to trig-
ger the state law limitation period. 106 The general rule appears to
be that the limitation period in a fraud case begins to run on the
date when the unlawful acts were discovered, 10 7 or should have
been discovered in the exercise of due diligence. 08
C. Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act 109
Although section 17(a) has not been utilized as fully as section
103. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); Sargent v. Genesco, Inc., 492
F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1974); Parrent v. Midwest Rug Mills, Inc., 455 F.2d 123 (7th
Cir. 1972).
104. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
105. Id. at 210 n.29.
106. E.g., Vanderboom v. Sexton, 422 F.2d 1233, 1240 (8th Cir. 1970). See generally
Bateman & Keith, Statutes of Limitations Applicable to Private Actions
Under SEC Rule 10b-5: Complexity in Need of Reform, 39 Mo. L. REv. 165
(1974).
107. Sargent v. Genesco, Inc., 492 F.2d 750, 758 (5th Cir. 1974).
108. Clement A. Evans & Co. v. McAlpine, 434 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
402 U.S. 988 (1971).
109. It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any
securities by the use of any means or instruments of transportation
or communication in interstate commerce or by the use of the mails,
directly or indirectly-
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue state-
ment of a material fact or any omission to state a material fact nec-
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10(b) and rule 10b-5, recent cases indicate that liability under it is
potentially much more expansive than that under those provi-
sions. Several lower court decisions subsequent to the Supreme
Court cases restricting the application of rule lOb-5 have held that
scienter is not an element of a claim based on section 17(a) of the
Securities Act of 1933. In SEC v. Southwest Coal & Energy Co.,"1 0
Judge Stagg concluded that since section 17(a) (1) prohibits the
employment of devices or schemes to defraud, application of a sci-
enter requirement to section 17(a) (2) would be meaningless as
every act covered by it would also be covered by section 17(a) (1).
Therefore, he concluded: "Congress must have intended not to re-
quire proof of scienter to establish a claim under § 17(a) (2) of the
1933 Act."'1 1 In Reid v. Madison,1 2 the court held that Blue Chip
Stamps 1 3 does not preclude non-purchaser action under section
17(a) of the 1933 Act. If the holdings of the lower courts are upheld
by the Supreme Court, this section of the Act will no doubt be em-
ployed for plaintiff actions to a far greater extent.114
IV. LIABILITY UNDER THE FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ACTS
State corporation laws and federal and state securities laws are
not the only source of potential liability for corporate directors and
officers. The United States Supreme Court held in 1968 that Sec-
tion 1982 of the Civil Rights Act"15 prohibits private as well as pub-
essary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the pur-
chaser.
(b) It shal be unlawful for any person, by the use of any means
or instruments of'transportation or communication in interstate com-
merce or by the use of the mails, to publish, give publicity to, or circu-
late any notice, circular, advertisement, newspaper, article, letter,
investment service, or communication which, though not purporting
to offer a security for sale, describes such security for a consideration
received or to be received, directly or indirectly, from an issuer, un-
derwriter, or dealer, without fully disclosing the receipt, whether past
or prospective, of such consideration and the amount thereof.
(c) The exemptions provided in section 3 shall not apply to the
provisions of this section.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2004(15) (A)-(3) (REissuE 1977).
1933 Act, § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1976).
110. 439 F. Supp. 820 (W.D. La. 1977).
111. Id. at 826.
112. 438 F. Supp. 332 (E.D. Va. 1977).
113. 421 U.S. 723 (1975). See notes 86-90 supra.
114. For an in-depth discussion of implied remedies under section 17(a), see Ha-
zen, A Look Beyond the Pruning of Rule 10b-5: Implied Remedies and Section
17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 64 VA. L. RE V. 641 (1978).
115. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1976).
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lic racial discrimination in the sale or rental of property."16 A year
later the Court held that damages were recoverable for violations
of section 1982.117 A similar cause of action is also available to
compensate injured parties under section 1981118 where private ra-
cial discrimination occurs in the formulation and enforcement of
contracts."19 The initial cases did not answer the question whether
sections 1981 and 1982 imposed personal liability upon corporate
directors and officers of the corporate violators of those provisions.
The case of first impression in this respect was Tillman v. Whea-
ton-Haven Recreation Association.120 In Tillman, the board of di-
rectors obtained an opinion from two attorneys who were both
under the mistaken belief that the corporation, a non-profit swim-
ming club, fell under the private club exception of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 and, therefore, could legally discriminate. After ob-
taining attorneys' opinions and concurrence by the membership,
the board of directors imposed a policy of racial discrimination.
The United States Supreme Court held that Wheaton-Haven was
not a private club and that the discriminatory admission policy vio-
lated Section 1982 of the Civil Rights Act.' 2 ' On remand, the dis-
trict court absolved the directors of all personal liability. However,
the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held the directors lia-
ble on the grounds that they had committed an intentional tort and
that due diligence was not a defense in such actions. 22 As long as
this holding prevails, corporate directors and officers must be ex-
tremely cautious when dealing with issues involving potential 1981
and 1982 violations.
V. INDEMNIFICATION AND CONTRIBUTION
In addition to discussing the potential liability of officers and
directors, the purpose of this article is to discuss potential sources
of contribution or indemnification. In many circumstances, a di-
rector or officer held personally liable by the courts will be entitled
to at least partial reimbursement for losses. This reimbursement
may include expenses of litigation and may include contribution
by the corporation or by other directors and officers.
A. Traditional Indenmification
The basic premise of common law agency is that the principal
116. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
117. Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969).
118. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976).
119. Olzman v. Lake Hills Swim Club, Inc., 495 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1974).
120. 517 F.2d 1141 (4th Cir. 1975).
121. Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431 (1973).
122. 517 F.2d 1141 (4th Cir. 1975).
[Vol. 58:692
1979] LIABILITY OF OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS 709
has a duty to indemnify an agent for damages the agent is required
to pay to a third person as a result of an authorized act which is
held to constitute a tort or breach of contract. 2 3 However, there
are serious gaps in the protection afforded directors and officers
under this principle of common law. One of the more serious
problems involves whether or not individuals can be considered
agents of the corporation in a derivative suit where the action is
brought for the benefit of the corporate principal against the direc-
tor agent. Courts have divided in applying the common law rules
to cases in which indemnification is sought for legal expenses in-
curred in a suit which was successfully defended. 24 On the other
hand, where the defense was not successful, indemnification tradi-
tionally has not been permitted. 25
B. Model Act
To broaden the common law concept of indemnification, the
committee on corporate law of the American Bar Foundation, in its
draft of the Model Business Corporation Act, included in section
5 a provision covering indemnification of officers, directors, em-
ployees, and agents.126 This provision of the Model Act has been
adopted in Nebraska. 27
The Act allows indemnification of corporate agents, including
any person who is or was a director, officer, employee or other
agent of the corporation, or is or was serving at the request of the
corporation as a director, officer, employee or agent of another cor-
poration, partnership, joint venture, trust or other enterprise. 2 8
123. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 439(c) (1958).
124. Solimine v. Hollander, 129 N.J. Eq. 264, 19 A.2d 344 (1941); New York Dock Co.
v. McCollom, 173 Misc. 106, 16 N.Y.S.2d 844 (1939).
125. In re E.C. Warner Co., 232 Minn. 207, 45 N.W.2d 388 (1950); Hollander v.
Breeze Corps., 131 N.J. Eq. 585, 26 A.2d 507, affid, 131 N.J. Eq. 613, 26 A.2d 522
(1941).
126. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT. ANN. § 5.
127. NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2004(15) (Reissue 1977).
128. (15) To indemnify as follows:
(a) A corporation shall have power to indemnify any person who
was or is a party or is threatened to be made a party to any
threatened, pending or completed action, suit or proceeding, whether
civil, criminal, administrative or investigative, other than an action
by or in the right of the corporation, by reason of the fact that he is or
was a director, officer, employee or agent of the corporation, or is or
was serving at the request of the corporation as a director, officer,
employee or agent of another corporation, partnership, joint venture,
trust or other enterprise, against expenses, including attorneys' fees,
judgments, fines and amounts paid in settlement actually and rea-
sonably incurred by him in connection with such action, suit or pro-
ceeding if he acted in good faith and in a manner he reasonably
believed to be in or not opposed to the best interests of the corpora-
tion, and, with respect to any criminal action or proceeding, had no
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Thus, an individual entitled to indemnification does not need to be
an insider of the corporation at the time the act was committed.
For example, Corporation X determines it should have A working
for Corporation Y to protect Corporation X's interest. Even
though A's salary is being paid by Y, the Act allows indemnifica-
tion by Corporation X for actions arising out of A's duty to it even
though A was actually employed by Y at the time the act was com-
mitted. The agency concept can be extended to cover outside at-
torneys, accountants, and other professional advisors.
C. Federal Public Policy
The fact that indemnification is allowed under the state statute
does not preclude a non-payment rule where federal laws and reg-
ulations reaching a different result have preempted the field. For
example, in Globus, Inc. v. Law Research Service, Inc. 129 the court
held that an underwriter who had actual knowledge of the omis-
sion of material facts from a prospectus could not enforce the in-
demnification provisions of the indemnity agreement against the
issuer. 3 0 Although directors or officers were not involved, the de-
cision was based upon the principle that one cannot insure oneself
reasonable cause to believe his conduct was unlawful. The termina-
tion of any action, suit or proceeding by judgment, order, settlement,
conviction, or upon a plea of nolo contendere or its equivalent, shall
not, of itself, create a presumption that the person did not act in good
faith and in a manner which he reasonably believed to be in or not
opposed to the best interests of the corporation, and, with respect to
any criminal action or proceeding, had reasonable cause to believe
that his conduct was unlawful;
(b) A corporation shall have power to indemnify any person
who was or is a party or is threatened to be made a party to any
threatened, pending or completed action or suit by or in the right of
the corporation to procure a judgment in its favor by reason of the
fact that he is or was a director, officer, employee or agent of the cor-
poration, or is or was serving at the request of the corporation, part-
nership, joint venture, trust or other enterprise against expenses,
including attorneys' fees, actually and reasonably incurred by him in
connection with the defense or settlement of such action or suit if he
acted in good faith and in a manner he reasonably believed to be in
or not opposed to the best interests of the corporation, except that no
indemnification shall be made in respect of any claim, issue or mat-
ter as to which such person shall have been adjudged to be liable for
negligence or misconduct in the performance of his duty to the cor-
poration unless and only to the extent that the court in which such
action or suit was brought shall determine upon application that de-
spite the adjudication of liability but in view of all circumstances of
the case, such person is fairly and reasonably entitled to indemnity
for such expenses which such court shall deem proper; ....
NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2004(15) (a)-(b) (Reissue 1977).
129. 318 F. Supp. 955 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
130. Id. at 957.
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against one's own reckless, willful, or criminal misconduct. 13 1
The SEC public policy position with regard to violations of the
Federal Securities Act of 1933 is expressed in a note to rule 460
which concerns acceleration of the effective date of the registration
statement.132 Federal courts have held that federal public policy
precludes indemnification for expenses incurred as a result of neg-
ligent violations of Section 12(2) of the 1933 Act, as well as for
fraudulent violations of rule 10b-5 under the 1934 Act.133
For indemnification purposes, there are different categories of
directors under the federal public policy concept. In Goldstein v.
Alodex Corp.,134 two outside directors sued the corporation for ex-
penses incurred in connection with defending a section 11 action.
A court-approved settlement of the action assessed liability for a
faulty registration statement. The two outside directors had re-
tained individual counsel to represent them in the case. The court
held that where state statutes and corporate by-laws allow indem-
nification, reimbursement to directors for litigation expenses was
not against public policy under the Securities Act of 1933.135 The
131. Id. at 958.
132. Note to SEC Rule 460, 17 C.F.R. § 230.460 (1978):
(a) Where, by reason of any charter provision, by-law, contract,
arrangements, statute, or otherwise, provision is made for indemnifi-
cation by the registrant of a director, officer or controlling person of
the registrant against liabilities arising under the act, unless waiver
is obtained from such officer, director or controlling person of the
benefits of such indemnification with respect to the proposed offering
or there is included in the registration statement, a brief description
of the indemnification provision and an undertaking in substantially
the following form:
Insofar as indemnification for liabilities arising under the Securi-
ties Act of 1933 may be permitted to directors, officers and controlling
persons of the registrant pursuant to the foregoing provisions, or
otherwise, the registrant has been advised that in the opinion of the
Securities and Exchange Commission such indemnification is
against public policy as expressed in the act and is, therefore, unen-
forceable. In the event that a claim for indemnification against such
liabilities (other than the payment by the registrant of expenses in-
curred or paid by a director, officer or controlling person of the regis-
trant in the successful defense of any action, suit or proceeding) is
asserted by such director, officer or controlling person in connection
with the securities being registered, the registrant will, unless in the
opinion of its counsel the matter has been settled by controlling pre-
cedent, submit to a court of appropriate jurisdiction the question
whether such indemnification by it is against public policy as ex-
pressed in the act and will be governed by the final adjudication of
such issue.
133. Odette v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 394 F. Supp. 946 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). This
case provides an excellent summation of the federal public policy concept
with regard to indemnification.
134. 409 F. Supp. 1201 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
135. Id. at 1206.
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directors had to show they had acted in good faith and had a valid
defense under section 11.136 The court's finding that the two direc-
tors were not personally liable obviously influenced its decision,
but the case clearly establishes that defendants may be catego-
rized for indemnification purposes.
D. Classification
The Model Act 137 and Nebraska statutes distinguish between
third party claims 138 and derivative actions. 139 Indemnification in
the case of a derivative suit is restricted to expenses including at-
torneys' fees, while in third party suits, indemnification may be al-
lowed not only for expenses but also for judgments, fines, and
amounts paid in settlement.14° The obvious policy reason for
broader coverage of third party claims is that in a derivative action,
the individual has allegedly violated his duty to a corporation
while in a third party action, the individual was presumably work-
ing in good faith for the corporate interests and, therefore, should
be protected under the principles of agency law. The Act further
provides that in either type of action where the individual has been
successful in defense of an action against him "he shall be indem-
nified against expenses, including attorneys' fees, actually and rea-
sonably incurred by him in connection therewith."' 4'
The corporation's power to indemnify directors and agents is
limited. Otherwise, important public policies other than federal
public policy could be undermined. The corporation may not in-
demnify with respect to any criminal action or proceeding unless
the officer or director had no reasonable cause to believe that his
conduct was unlawful.' 42 Also, the corporation may authorize in-
demnification in criminal actions only if the individual acted in
good faith and in a manner he reasonably believed to be in, or not
opposed to, the best interests of the corporation. 4 3 The meaning
136. Id.
137. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT. ANN. § 5.
138. NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2004(15) (a) (Reissue 1977). See note 128 supra.
139. NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2004(15) (b) (Reissue 1977). See note 128 supra.
140. NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2004(15) (a)-(b) (Reissue 1977).
141. (c) To the extent that a director, officer, employee or agent of a cor-
poration has been successful on the merits or otherwise in defense of
any action, suit or proceeding referred to in subdivisions (a) and (b)
of this subdivision, or in defense of any claim, issue or matter
therein, he shall be indemnified against expenses, including attor-
neys' fees, actually and reasonably incurred by him in connection
therewith ....
NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2004(15) (c) (Reissue 1977) (emphasis added). The use
of "shall" means indemnification is mandatory.
142. NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2004(15) (a) (Reissue 1977). See note 128 supra.
143. NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2004(15) (a) (Reissue 1977). See note 128 supra.
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of the term "has been successful on the merits or otherwise in de-
fense of any action" has resulted in controversy, particularly with
regard to partial success. In a Delaware case an officer of a corpo-
ration contended he was entitled to indemnification as a matter of
right under this provision where the case had been dismissed with-
out prejudice.144 The court held that since the same issue may be
litigated in another case, an indemnification award before conclu-
sion of the other case would be premature and contrary to the
spirit of the statute. 145 With regard to partial success, a Delaware
court held the language means that success is vindication and that
in a criminal action, any result other than conviction is success
within the meaning of the statute. 4 6 The court also held that a
director or officer is entitled to indemnification if successful in one
count under an indictment but unsuccessful in another related
count. 47 In such a situation the fee is prorated to the percent at-
tributed to the defense on each count. 4 8
The Act has a nonexclusive remedy clause which appears to
permit far broader indemnification remedies under by-laws, spe-
cific agreements or actions by shareholders. 149 The case of Koster
v. Warren °5 0 illustrates this point. In Koster, the corporation in-
duced its former president, Warren, to plead nolo contendere to
avoid litigation and consequently limit corporate civil liability. As
a price for changing his plea, the corporation agreed to pay litiga-
tion expenses and any fine he might have to pay. In a share-
holder's suit attacking the payment, the court held the corporation
acted reasonably in reimbursing Warren.' 15 However, there is a
possibility that in certain cases such remedies would be found to
violate public policy and therefore be nonenforceable. 5 2
144. Galdi v. Berg, 359 F. Supp. 698 (D. Del. 1973).
145. Id. at 702.
146. Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Wolfson, 321 A.2d 138, 141 (Del. Super. Ct.
1974).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2004(15) (f) (Reissue 1977):
(f) The indemnification provided by this section shall not be
deemed exclusive of any other rights to which those indemnified may
be entitled under any by-law, agreement, vote of shareholders, mem-
bers, or disinterested directors or otherwise, both as to action in his
official capacity and as to action in another capacity while holding
such office, and shall continue as to a person who has ceased to be a
director, officer, employee or agent and shall inure to the benefit of
the heirs, executors and administrators of such a person ....
150. 176 F. Supp. 459 (N.D. Cal. 1959), affd, 297 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1961).
151. Id. at 462.
152. Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Wolfson, 264 A.2d 358 (Del. Super. Ct. 1970);
Diamond v. Diamond, 307 N.Y. 263, 120 N.E.2d 819 (1954); Mooney v. Willys-
Overland Motors, Inc., 204 F.2d 888 (3d Cir. 1953). In Diamond, one of two
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Under section 21-2004(15), indemnification other than that or-
dered by a court or provided for by a law or other appropriate
agreement shall be made only where authorized in a specific case
upon determination that indemnification of the eligible individual
is proper under the statute. The determination must be made in
each case by a majority vote of a quorum of the board of directors
consisting of directors not parties to the action. If impossible to
obtain the necessary quorum, or where the quorum of directors so
directs, indemnification may be made upon written advice of in-
dependent legal counsel or upon approval by the shareholders.
153
Approval by shareholders would be most difficult particularly in
publicly held corporations. This leaves the opinion of independent
counsel as the most viable alternative. How is counsel classified as
independent? Clearly the inside counsel would not be appropriate.
Also questionable is whether regular outside counsel is independ-
ent within the statutory meaning. A safe course would be to seek
the opinion of special counsel appointed for this purpose only.
Such a procedure is not without its inherent problems such as how
thorough an investigation can reasonably be made by the counsel
before, in most cases, discovery proceedings have begun. One pos-
sible solution is to appoint additional neutral directors so the nec-
essary neutral quorum of the board may be obtained.
In many cases, indemnification provisions of the Act may not be
satisfactory. Therefore, corporate planners should consider in-
shareholders of a corporation brought a derivative action against the other
alleging negligence and mismanagement. The lower court dismissed the case
on the ground that plaintiff participated along with defendant and was
thereby estopped from bringing the action. The court then granted defendant
indemnification for his legal expenses on the ground that he was successful
in the action. On appeal the court held defendant was not entitled to indem-
nification as he had been adjudged liable for misconduct. Indemnification in
such a case, in the words of the court, "would place the statute in opposition
to the fundamental principles not only of law but of good conscience and
morals." Id. at 821. See generally Heiyler, Indemnification of Corporate
Agents, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1255 (1976).
153. NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2004(15) (d) (Reissue 1977):
(d) Any indemnification under subdivisions (a) and (b) of this
subdivision, unless ordered by a court, shall be made by the corpora-
tion only as authorized in the specific case upon a determination that
indemnification of the director, officer, employee or agent is proper in
the circumstances because he has met the applicable standard of
conduct set forth in subdivisions (a) and (b) of this subdivision.
Such determination shall be made by the board of directors by a ma-
jority vote of a quorum consisting of directors who were not parties
to such action, suit or proceeding, or if such a quorum is not obtain-
able, or, even if obtainable a quorum of disinterested directors so di-
rects, by independent legal counsel in a written opinion, or by the
shareholders or members, as the case may be ....
See notes 141 & 149 supra.
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demnification provisions within the by-laws of the corporation,
thereby taking outside the scope of the Act the determination of
when indemnification is to be paid. In addition, the basic provi-
sions and safeguards of the Act could be incorporated into the by-
laws to permit tailoring indemnification procedures to fit a
particular corporation. In drafting such provisions, the drafter
must consider the possible conflicts with public policy. 5 4
E. Contribution
Many states and certain sections of the Federal Securities Acts
specifically provide for contribution among intentional wrongdo-
ers.155 Where the statutes do not specifically provide for contribu-
tion, there seems to be a definite trend to allow contribution even
in the absence of specific statutory authority. Judge Frankel's po-
sition in this regard in Globus156 illustrates this trend. Here one of
the three defendants found jointly and severally liable attempted
to recover from the other two where he had paid the full amount of
the judgment. The judgment resulted from common law fraud and
violation of Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act and Section 10(b) of the
1934 Act. New York law did not permit contribution. Nevertheless,
Judge Frankel fashioned a federal rule of contribution stating: "De-
parting from the rugged flintiness of traditional common law, the
general drift of the law today is toward the allowance of contribu-
tion among joint tortfeasors.' '157 Judge Frankel cited deHaas v.
Empire Petroleum Co.,158 for the principle that since sections of
the Securities Act expressly providing for civil liability contained
express provisions for contribution, contribution should be ex-
tended to section 10(b) cases since the court had extended imposi-
tion of civil liabilities to such cases. 159 Although the extent of
allowable contribution is not clearly established, the position of
Judge Frankel appears to be the direction the courts are taking in
this matter.160
VI. INSURANCE
In addition to indemnification and contributions, another possi-
154. Kansas City Operating Corp. v. Durwood, 278 F.2d 354 (8th Cir 1960).
155. 1933 Act, § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1976); 1934 Act, §§ 9, 18, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78(i), 78(r)
(1976). See also Radoff, Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors, 44 Tnx. L.
REv. 326 (1965).
156. Globus, Inc., v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 318 F. Supp. 955 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
157. Id. at 957.
158. 286 F. Supp. 809, 815-16 (D. Colo. 1968).
159. 318 F. Supp. at 958.
160. For a more complete discussion, as it specifically relates to rule 10b-5 actions,
see Fischer, Contribution in 10b-5 Actions, 33 Bus. LAw. 1821 (1978).
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ble source of reimbursement for losses involving personal liability
for actions taken in the corporate capacity is insurance. Section
21-2004 authorizes corporations to purchase and maintain insur-
ance on directors and officers against personal liability whether or
not the corporation has the power to indemnify the individual
under the Corporation Act.161 The exclusions under the standard
policy are numerous and include libel and slander, personal profit
or advantage, illegal remuneration, section 16(b) cases, dishon-
esty, corporate indemnification, and pollution. 162 If the numerous
exclusions and relatively high cost are not a sufficient deterrent,
there is the additional problem as to whether payment of the in-
surance is precluded in certain situations because of public policy
considerations. For example, a well established principle of the
law of liability insurance is that an insurance policy indemnifying
an insured against liability due to his willful wrong is void as
against public policy. Losses attributable to dishonesty or inten-
tional misconduct, or other conduct which the courts find to be suf-
ficiently serious to violate accepted notions of public policy, would
be eliminated from coverage. 163 The real problem arises in the
area of gross negligence where public policy application is not
clearly defined. If one follows the doctrine that the public policy
doctrine is applicable as a deterrent, then it can be argued persua-
sively that insurance should be valid in this area. This is so be-
cause gross negligence is determined as a matter of hindsight and
is not likely to be deterred by uncertainty of insurance coverage.
However, even if the public policy argument prevails, many poli-
cies specifically exclude coverage of losses resulting from gross
negligence. Although insurance is not in most cases the ultimate
solution to all personal liability situations, it should be considered
with other alternatives. 1
64
161. NEB. REv. STAT. § 21-2004(15) (g) (Reissue 1977):
(g) A corporation shall have power to purchase and maintain insur-
ance on behalf of any person who is or was a director, officer, em-
ployee or agent of the corporation, or is or was serving at the request
of the corporation as a director, officer, employee or agent of another
corporation, partnership, joint venture, trust or other enterprise
against any liability asserted against him and incurred by him in any
such capacity or arising out his status as such, whether or not the
corporation would have the power to indemnify him against such lia-
bility under the provisions of this section ....
162. See Johnston, Corporate Indemnification and Liability Insurance for Direc-
tors and Officers, 33 Bus. LAw. 1993 (1978).
163. See R. KEETON, INSURANCE LAw § 5.4 (1971).
164. For an in-depth discussion of the problem, see Johnston, supra note 162. See
also M. SCHAEFrLER, THE LIABILrTIES OF OFFICE: INDEMNIFICATION AND INSUR-
ANCE OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS (1976).
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VII. CONCLUSION
Personal liability for acts committed in the corporate name has
become a potentially serious problem for directors and officers of
corporations. Even though the United States Supreme Court has
recently reduced the areas of liability under the Securities Acts,
the potential of large losses in actions brought as a result of inad-
vertent acts is still real and very much alive. In addition, common
law actions may possibly be substituted for many actions that
were formerly brought under the Securities Acts. Ultimately, at-
torneys involved with corporation law should make sure that their
director and officer clients are aware of their potential liability as
well as the various steps available to reduce that liability.
